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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
EBBA E. FIN LA YSOX and .ALLAK
FINLAYSOX,
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

-vs.-

No. 7713

KENNETI-I BRADY and DONALD .
.B. ~IILNE, partners doing .business
as Brady-l\Iilne Appliance Company.

Defendants and Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
KATURE OF THE CASE
The respondents agree with the appellants' statement of the Nature of the Case in most part -except,
wherein appellants state that the respondents br-ought
a separate suit upon the smne theory as appellants ( appellants' brief page 4) and contend that the basis of
the second suit is as pointed out in respondents Answer
-and Counterclaim ( R. 12).
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STATEMENT OF· FACTS.
The statement of facts as made by the appellants
is certainly stated most favorable to the appellants and
in most particulars is argumentative, misconceives the
pleadings, is based upon suppositions, assumptions, and
is sought to draw unfair inferences. The evidence adduced at the trial certainly does not support the facts as
stated by the appellants, therefore, it becomes inherent
that the respondents restate them in or:der that they may
be correctly viewed.
Since the p~ints argued by the appellant primarily
deal with the sufficiency of the evidence, and since answering them requires a complete review of the evidence,
the respondents only wish to make a brief statement of
the facts· at this time.
In the summer of 1948 the appellants were constructing an apartment building consisting of three four-room
apartments and one three-room apartment situated at
466 Lindell Lane, Sandy, Utah (R. 115, 239). Each
apartment was to be and is heated with a separate gas
space heater (R. 116, 238, Exhibit B). Apartment No.
1 was located on the ground floor, west side of the building, apartment No. 2 on the ground floor east, apartment No. 3 in the basement under No. 2, and apartment
No. 4 was likewise in the basement under No. 1 (R. 144,
145). All chimneys, flues, pipes, lead-ins, etc., was constructed solely by the appellants and not the respondents.
Two separate· flue chimneys were constructed by Mr.
Finlayson in the building, one on the east side to provide
4
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vents for aparhnent~ No. :2 and :; and the other on the
"~est side to vent the heating units in apartments No.
1 and 4 (R. 121, 1:2:2, 1:2~~, 144, 145) both of which are inadequate ( R. :2R~~).
The appellants In their brief, page No. 4, contend
that ~Ir. Finlayson had known the respondents for 1nany
years and infer that due to this relationship unfair advantage had been taken of them. Such is not the case, as
both of the respondents deny knowing :Mr. Finlayson
personally until the tinte of son1e business transactions
~;everal n10nths prior to the case at bar (Exhibits 1, 6,
7).
In August 1948 :Mr. Finlayson contacted ~Ir. l\filne
regarding the purchase of the n1erchandise in question
(R. 238, 306). ~lr. Finlayson represented to l\Ir. :~1ilne,
at this time, that he was securing bids for said Inerchandise and that he had already requested pennission to go
ahead for the gas (H. 154, 239) when actually he did not
even make application for the gas until December 27,
1948, as is shown by a ~fountain Fuel Supply Co. Official
(R. 219, 220).
After inspeding the 1nerchandise, at the respondents' ~Iurray :--;tore, the appellants purchased the lnerchandise shown in Exhibit B. ~rhe 1nerchandise purchased consisted of 4 Servel Gas Refrigerators, 4 Harwick Gas Ranges, 1 Servel \Vater Heater, 3-50,000 BTU
and 1-30,000 BTl' Brilliant Fire Gas Space lieaters with
a total lJUrchase price of $1,675.00 (Exhibits B, 6, 7).
All of the space heaters were at the time and still arc
5
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American Gas Association approved and listed, the
standards set up for such approval being set by the
American Standards Association (R. 218). The heaters
in question were manufactured by the Ohio Manufacturing Company (R. 219, 263) which company has been in
business some 105 years (R. 263). The appellants have
made an issue of the fact that they did not get Crosley
Space Heaters (R. 119, 129, 136, 141), yet the respondents have never carried such a brand heater (R. 250,
251, 284, 314) and in fact no such type heater even exists
as is evidenced by two gas company officials and according to the American Gas Association Directory (R.
202, 218).
Mr. Finlayson indicated to Mr. Milne, at the time of
purchase, that he desired to pay cash but wanted a
couple of months to pay it in (R. 242, 243). Relying upon
this and the fact that the respondents had had satisfactory business relations with the appellants several
months previous to this (Exhibits 1, 6 & 7, R. 238) the
respondents ordered some of the goods not on hand (R.
241) and set aside within a few weeks time as Mr. Finlayson's property the above items (Exhibit 6 & 7, R. 239,
246, 247, 285). During the course of business the respondents often sell merchandise the terms of payment
for which is considered to be cash if paid within 60 or
90 days. However, in order to protect themselves they
require the customer to sign a conditional sale contract
("Protective Contract") and do not date it at that time.
Then if after the alloted time the customer can not meet
the requirements for cash he is given credit for the pay6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ments 1nade to date mul a new contract is executed.
Sueh i:"' the eaH' here (ll. :24:2-:2-t:q. On .August 14, 1948,
(H. :2~~S) whieh is contrary to appellants' contention of
December 6, 19-l:S (appellants' brief page 5, U. 118, 120,
143, 153) $50.00 wa:"' paid a:"' a partial down pay1nent
(Exhibit:; 1 & 7) which i~ also contrary to ~[r. Finlay~on ":: ; testiu10ny that he ncn:r made any such paynwnt
(H. 146) and the .. protective contract'' (Exhibit A) was
executed. rrhe respondenb after being told at the tinle
of the sale on .August 1-t. 1!l48 (R. 2:18) that the appellants had applied for the gas (U. 239) when such was not
the case (R. :21!1, ~:20), and having been disappointed on
the pronrise of the appellant~ to pay ca~h within 90 days
(R. 242, 243, 2-!4, 248, 249 286, 307) as well as having
the nterchandise tied up in their warehouse eannarked
for the re~pondents (R. 283, Exhibit 6), beca1ne apprehensive of the good faith of the appellants. Nevertheless, they leaned over backwards to try and expedite
the installation of the gas (R. 239, 240), continued to
listen to the tales of woe of the appellants (R. 242, 243,
248, :249, 286, 307) in respect to the pay1nents to be made,
and very foolishly installed the 1nerchandise on December 31, 1948 ( n. 127' 2;)3) in order to try and get the
payn1ents as pr01nised.
K o further payments were n1ade on this agree1nent
until January 17, 1949 (Exhibits 1 & 7) s01ne 156 days
after the fir~t payment and then only $150.00 (Exhibits
C, 1 & 7) was paid 'vhich would still make the down
payment short $140.00 of the $:340.00 required as evidenced by Exhibit A and B in case the cash tenus could
7
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not be met. The cash terms were definitely not met and
it took the respondents an additional 45 days more to
get the appellants to sign the contract in question (Exhibit B) which would be a mere 66 days past the 90 days
originally granted. Exhibit B was signed on March 3,
1949 in the appellants' home (R. 306) and superseded
Exhibit A (R. 244) and was not signed three weeks after
Exhibit A, or December 27, 1948, as contended by the
appellants (appellants' brief page 5 and R. 120). At
the time of signing Exhibit B the appellants paid the
respondents $140.00 (Exhibits D, 1 & 7, R. 249, 307)
which amount completed the $340.00 down payment,
which is contrary to the appellants contention (appellants' brief page 5).
S.ometime between the date of installation of the
equipment (R. 238) and the making of the second contract (Exhibit B) the appellants painted their apartments Nos. 1 and 2 and spilled paint on both refrigerators (R. 242, 314) and as a result of such the respondents were forced to replace, at their own expense, said
refrigerators or else not get paid for any of the merchandise (R. 241) and have not been able to sell one of
them to date. Therefore, they are out the price of this
refrigerator-$185.75 (Exhibits 6 & 7).
Two weeks after the valid contract (Exhibit B) was
signed the respondents sold the contract to the Sandy
City Bank with full recourse, March 16, 1949 to be exact
(Exhibit 5) and the money receipted for on March 17,
1949 (Exhibits 1 & 7). Additional payments amounting
8
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to $9~:L50 haYt' been nuule on the eontract (.Exhibit 5,
H. ~:2-:2:). 1:2;)) leaying a habnH'P on the contrad of $491.-

"ir> (Exl1ibits 5 & 7, R.. :2:2-:25, 330) which is contrary to
appellants' contention in appellants' brief page 6 wherein they clailn that only $:20:2.13 i~ due and in appellants'
statement (H. 14:3) where he clain1~ that only $201.00 is
~till due and owing. As a result of the appellants' habitual delinquency in the pay1nents of the Inonthly installment~ to Sandy City Bank the respondents were forced
on Xovember 7, 1950 to repurchase the contract (Exhibits 5 & 7, R. 22-25).
The appellants contend that they refused to make
any further paynwnts due to defective heaters (appellants' brief page 7) but a careful analysis of Exhibit
3 shows that not one but ev~ry payment, fron1 the tune
of the due date of the first installn1ent until the present
time, is delinquent and that at least 6 payments were
not paid on tiu1e prior to the tirne the appe~lants mentioned that the heaters were turned on in Septetnber
1949 (appellants' brief page 6, R. 128).
The respondents, as they norrnally do, agreed to
make only a nonnal hook-up installation of the equipment (TI. 10, 240, 2GO)-i.e.-hook-up the appliances to
whateYer facilities that the purchaser has arranged and
this they did. rJ,he respondent:-; also agreed to guarantee,
either expressly or irnpliedly, the heaters for one heating
season only ( R. :25:2, 260, 311, 316). At the time the
piece~ of equipment were installed the respondents informed the appellant~ that the provisions made h:· the
9
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appellants were not adequate and that they would not
pass inspection by the Gas Company but the appellants
insisted that the connections be made to the existing
facilities (R. 268, 272, 289, 290, 292) and the gas was
inspected and turned on by the Gas Company officials
(R. 211, 221, 289). As a result of the connections of the
heaters to the Finlayson provided flues (R. 268) and in
the position desired by the appellants it necessitated the
respondents to install 3 additional L's on each heater
(R. 272, 274) which in turn cut down the efficiency (R.
272, 275). The main chimneys as installed by Mr. Finlayson were not adequate to properly care for the BTU output of the equipment installed (R. 279, 380). The stoves
and refrigerators are not vented at all, yet they put out
approximately one-half the output of gases that each
heater does (R. 279-280).
The appellants contend that the heaters leaked gas
and were defective (appellants' brief pages 6-7). The
respondents however, submit that the true facts are that
such heaters were not defective, but if there was any gas
leakage it was due to the faulty flues and the way the
appellants insisted that the heaters be installed (R. 272,
278, 279, 280, 283, 284, 285, 311, 313) as well as to the
other eight pieces of gas equipment casting fumes into
the rooms because they were not vented at all (R. 278,
279, 280, 283). The appellants also contend (appellants'
brief page 6) that the appellants lost $525.00 in rental
due to the heaters. No evidence of any nature was adduced at the trial to show that the apartments were vacant due to the heaters, and quite to the contrary three
10
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\\·itne::;se~

for the respondent~. all of wh01n lived in the
apartment~ during the period in question, stated that
the heaters functioned properly and they moved because
of the inconvenience of the location of the aparbnents,
tlw sil'A', and becan:-;l• the rental~ were too high (H. 139,
~9-!, :297, ~99). ...:-\. careful analysi~ of Exhibit 2, which
i~ the ofiicial turn on and off, a~ well as 1ueter readings
of the t;·n~ cmnpany, will reveal that even if the apartment::_.; were e1npty due to the heaters (which they were
not) under no tircumstan(·e~ could there have been a loss
of $5~5.00 as tharged but only $425.66, or approxilnately
$100.00 le~~ than that prayed for. (This will be treated
more fully in respondents' argu1nent ~ o. 1).
At no tin1e frou1 the time of installation on Decen1ber
~1, 1948 ( R. 1:2 7, 23:3) until K oven1ber 1949 ( R. 250, 253,
:235, :23~, :276, 30:2, 309, 311) did the appellants complain
in respect to the heaters. In K ovmnber 1949 the appellanb dreamed up a new excuse for non-payrnent and
notified the Sandy City Bank that the heaters leaked gas
and they refused to umke any further payrnents until
the heaters were fixed. The bank in turn notified the
respondents (Exhibit E, H. 309) and the respondents
confident that the leakage, if any, was not due to the
heaters but to the flues and inadequate venting (R. 278,
279, 280, :2S3, 30~, 304), but being desirous of cooperating
to the "K" degree foolishly extended the olive branch
once more and agreed to take the heaters out and weld
the collars on them, (H. 230, 2G:3, 2;>;,, 258, 276, 297, 309,
:nl), although in all their ~ix years experience (lt 277)
and the instal1ation of ~mne G-1 sintilar heaters (R. 283)
11
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they had never had to do such. These heaters were only
out about four hours (R. 220, 221, 277, 297, 310) which is
contrary to the two or three weeks claimed by the appellants. No further complaints were made to the respondents, or the gas company, relative to the heaters,
except, one in May 9, 1950 to light a pilot light, until approximately one year later-October 1950 (R. 191, 197,
250, 255, 258, 276, 309, 311) and at which time Mr. Brady
again informed the appellants that the fault was not
with the heaters but with the venting and flue installation by Mr. Finlayson. At the time of this complaint,
which was only the second complaint from the time of
installation, Mr. Brady stated that the heaters were out
of warranty, as the guarantee only lasted one season
(R. 252, 260, 311, 316), but if Mr. Finlayson would give
Brady-Milne permission to raise the flues and would pay
for it he thought such procedure would rectify the situation. Mr. Brady at this time, much to his surprise,
learned that the appellants had sold the equipment and
apartment house to Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Anderson on
December 21, 1949 (R. 302, 303) which was in direct violation of paragraph 3 of the terms of the contract (Exhibit B). Mr. Brady immediately called Mrs. Anderson
(R. 303, 304) and she requested him to raise the flues.
The respondent went further however, and discussed
the matter with the gas company and took the heaters
out and up to the Gas Company's warehouse and had
some scientific tests run on them. They were there but
one afternoon (R. 213, 220, 221, 313) and were pronounced all right when returned. A close analysis of
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l~xhibit. #3 will show that the fir~t and only maintenance
call made by the ~a~ <·mnpany bet ween Derember :~I,
1948 and Septmnber 1930, other than in October 1949 at
the respondents' request, \Yas not until :\fay 9, 1950 and
then it wa~ only to light a pilot light on the heater in
Apt. #2-~lr. K.enneth D. 1-Iakanson. Therefore, the
flr~t heat_ing season went along without event other
than the four hours in October 1949 and the one service
call to light the pilot light. The appellants' only witness
during the first heating season (:\In~. Strebel, R. 186)
even testified that no trouble existed during the first
heating season, likewise, the new unauthorized owner
testified to such (R. 302).

At no tilne since purchase until the present date
has the appellanb offered to return the heaters or asked
to have them replaced (H. 254).
At the conclusion of the trial the court directed a
verdict in favor of the defendants-respondents and
against the plaintiffs-appellants and further directed
that judgntent he entered in the sunt of $491.73 (the balance due on the contract-Exhibit B) in favor of the
defendants-respondent~, and for interest, costs, and attorney's fees.

POINT ONE
There i;-; sufficient eYideuee to sustain the Court's
findings and in the direction of a verdict in favor of
13
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the defendants-respondents and against the plaintiffsappellants (Reply to appellants' Point One).
POINT TWO
There is sufficient evidence to sustain the court's
judgment and award of attorney's fees as the appellants
had continuously breached the contract from the very
beginning and in many respects (Reply to appellants'
Point Two).
POINT THREE
The court below properly denied plaintiffs-appellants motion for a new trial (Reply to appellants' Point
Three).
POINT FOUR
The appellants have compelled the respondents to
defend this appeal, therefore, the court should award
the respondents a reasonable attorney's fee and costs
in compliance with Exhibit B, or else remand this case
to the trial court for the trial court to award such.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
Passing now to the main issues involved which are
breach of contract, loss of rental, and breach of warranty
14
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(appellanh: • brief pag-e ~)). rrhe l'P:-:pondents re:-:pectfully
1n·psent the following t·,·idt•HvP, dirPd testilnony, and
~tnkments to show that then_\ wa:-: no breach of contract
on their part, but the breaches, and we :-:ay breaehes,
were on the part of the appellants: that there wa:-: no loss
of rentals as a result of the heaters and even if there
"·a~ a lo~s, reganlle:::.;s of the reason, it could not be
nearly the mnount a:-: claiu1ed by the appellants; that
there wa:::.; no breach of warranty on the part of the re~pondents, and even if there was such a breach, the appellanb had estopped thmnselves frma setting up this
defense .
..:\ good beginning point i:::.; the understanding in the
minds of the respondents at the ti1ne the contract (Exhibit A & B) waf' made which is expressed best by the
direct testimony of :Jir. )Iilne:
:JIR.

S~\GERS:
~\t

"Q.

the time of the purchase or conversation
relative to the purchase of this Inerchandise,
what was said relative to the 1nethod of payInent?

..:\.

:Jir. Finlay:-:on wanted to pay cash if possible,
hut he wanted, oh, I think in the conversation
maybe ninety days to pay that cash; and
I took it for granted that the line would be
installed very quickly, and we could install
our nwn·handi~e. Of course, I agreed that
we could probably have it installed hy that
time satisfactorily, and he could pay the
eash. (R. ~-l-:2, :z-1-:~, 244).

,.. * *

15
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Q.

Now, what is the reason for no date on that
contract (Exhibit A)~

A.

Oftimes in our business dealings a person
who wants to pay cash, if we agree orally
that we will give them sixty or ninety days,
we still have to have other protection, and so
we ask our customer to sign the contract
so that if we don't get the cash in the specified time, then the contract will protect us
in the sale of the property, and I think that's
what happened here.

* * *
Q. Well, in this particular case or a case similar
to this, if the money was not paid within the
sixty or ninety days agreed upon, then with
the consent of the purchaser you would place
the date in~
A.

Yes.

Q.

And then you would sell the contract in order
to get your money~

A.

Well, during this time he may have made half
the total payment, and so at that time a new
contract would be made up and sent in.
That often times happens. If a customer
thinks he can get it in ninety days and he
can't, he is still given credit for the amount
he has paid and the new contract made out.
That's our procedure." (R. 243, 244).

Contrary to the appellants' contention (appellants'
brief page 5, R. 118, 120, 145, 153) that the "protective
contract" (Exhibit A) was signed on December 6, 1948
and that the valid contract (Exhibit B) was signed three
weeks later-December 27, 1948, (R. 120) the respond16
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ent~

submit that the .. protective eontraet'' was ~igneu
on August 1+. 19-!S (H. ~:is, :2-1::1. imG) and the valid contract wn~ signed in the appellants' home on l\lnrch 3,
1949 (R. 30G) sorne :201 Jays after the initial down payment of $50.00 and at no time was any contract of any
nature signed in Decentber 1948. At the tin1e of the con~ummation of Exhibit B thl' tentative contract (Exhibit
A) became null and void (R. :244). The appellants contend that they have 1nade payn1ents of $290.00 for which
they have not been given eredit (R. 151 and appellants'
brief page 5) and ~tate that they made a lun1p su1n cash
payment of $340.00 (R. 121, 147). ~rr. Finlayson testified that he did not know anything about the $50.00 cash
down payment on August 14, 19-18 (R. 146). It is hardly
feasible that the respondents would give the appellants
c.redit for this amount without receiving it from them.
A ~em·ch of appellants' co1nplaint (R. 1-6) and counterclaim (H. 76-80) show that no recovery is sought for this
so-called additional $290.00 (Exhibits C & D). Exhibits
1 & 7, which are the respondents official records, show
that appellants were given proper credit for these two
amounts. It will be noted that the appellants stipulated
to and agreed at the time of the pretrial (R. 22-25) that
the balance due was $491.73 and that only $983.50 over
and above the $:340.00 down payrnent had been made.
This appellants eonfinned in direct testi1nony (R. 125).
'ro further refute that $340.00 was not paid in one sum
(H. 259) we in,·ite the court's attention to the respondent:-;' testimony (H. :231, :254, 315) wherein they show tlwt
a contract is never u::;eu a:-:; a receipt. It is ridiculou::;
17
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to assume that a person is going to sign a second contract
without getting full credit and then wait two years to
raise such a point as was done here. However, to dispell any misapprehension that may have arisen the respondents respectfully submit the true facts adduced
at the trial :
At the time the "protective contract" (Exhibit A)
was signed the respondents received $50.00 in cash (Exhibits 1 & 7) and were to receive the full balance of the
contract within 90 days (R. 242, 243). The respondents
not normally stocking gas refrigerators as required by
the appellants purchased them especially for the appellants (R. 241). All the merchandise was set aside
in the respondents' warehouse for the use and benefit
of the appellants and were to be delivered when requested (R. 239, 246, 247, 285 and Exhibit 6). The
respondents and their agents leaned backwards to try to
cooperate with the appellants and even took the appellants to the Gas Company to see if they could expedite
the installation of the gas line (R. 239, 240) even though
the appellants had misrepresented the facts at the time
they ordered the equipment by stating that they had
already applied for the gas (R. 154, 239) when actually
they never applied until December 1948 (R. 219, 220).
All during the period from August 14, 1948, at the time
the protective contract was signed, until March 3, 1949,
the respondents tried in vain to obtain the purchase price
in cash from the appellants as they had agreed to pay
(R. 242, 243, 244, 248, 286, 307) but were unsuccessful
18
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in their efforts. r_rhere WH~ a period of SOille fi n• lllOnths
in which the respondenb had only n·<·Pi n•d $50.00 on the
full purchase price (H. ~48, 249, 307 and Exl1ibits 1 & 7)
and even installed the merchandise on December 31,
19-!S (R. 1:21, ~33) with only this $50.00 payn1ent having
been made. ..After further efforts of trying to get the
ea~h the appellants finally paid $150.00 on January 17,
1949 (Exhibits C, 1 & 7, R. 248, 249, 307) and $140.00
on .llarch :~. 1949 (Exhibits D, 1 & 7, H. 248, 249, 307).
These two mnounts plus the $50.00 paid on August 14,
19-!S completed the total down payntent of $340.00 (Exhibit~ B, 1 & I) which was so indicated on Exhibit B
signed ~Iarch :1, 1949 in the appellants' ho1ne. r_ro further refute appellants' contention a close analysis of
appellanb · Exhibit ~"- "·ill show that $340.00 wa~ not paid
in cash at that tin1e because if you take the total cash
price of $1675.00 and add the tinw differential of $159.68
to it the total bec01nes $1,834.68 which is shown as the
total tin1e price, also, this contract is not con1plete a~ to
date, due dates, amounts of 1nonthly pay1nents, etc.,
whereas Exhibit B the true contract is complete in all
respect. Further evidence that Exhibit A is merely
a "protecti'{.?e eontnwf' and a contract is never considered a receipt is indicated by the record (R. 243, 244,
~:>1, 2G+, 314).

.

The trial court only permitted the introduction of
Exhibit A for the purpose of deciding "·hether the court
would permit the appellants to amend the pretr]nl ordee
(ll. 1:2/). 1,he court stated as follow~:
19
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THE COURT:
Well I am going to let it in at this time
because_ I have got to determine whether or not
I shall permit an amendment later, and for that
purpose it will be received.
The trial court's answer to this is shown by the court's
statement at the termination of the trial as follows: (R.
327, 328).

THE COURT:
* * * The plaintiffs asked leave to amend this
agreement and prove to you that $340.00 for
which he had no receipt but which was recited
in the contract was paid and then these $50.00,
$150.00, and $140.00 items that make up the $340.00 were separate items that he wanted credit for,
and that just doesn't ring true to me. A man
that pays $140.00 on March 3 and then enters into a con tract sometime between then and March
7 and still takes the old $340.00 and doesn't claim
anything in his contract when they enter $340.00,
if he had paid $340.00 in cash before, he certainly
would have said "Listen boy, let's up this price
from $340.00 to include the additional $340.00 that
I just got through paying you." He didn't do
that, so I am not going to permit him to amend
-that. I don't think there is anything to it, so you
won't have to bother about that.
To further substantiate the court's position and to
show the absurbity of the contention we quote from
the appellants' own testimony as follows: (R. 151, 152).
MR. SAGERS:

"Q.

Just didn't understand it. Yet you gave
$290.00 without making a complaint for it,
20
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and you had your eancelled eheek~, one or
then1 dated JanuarY whieh would have
deared the bank and ~·on have another whieh
you g-nn.~ jn~t a eou1;le of day~ before this
i~ dated. How do yon explain it? .\ re you in
the habit of g-oing and throwing away $290.00 without ~·L·tt ing credit for it?

A.

Oh, no.

Therefore, we sub1nit that the only payments n1ade
on either Exhibit A or B, and the record bears it out
(Exhibit 1, H. :2-!S. :2-t-9, 307) was the $50.00 on August
1-1, El-±~. the $150.00 on January 17, 19-!9 and $140.00
on ~larch 3, 1949.
rrhe appellant:-' lll their statelnent of facts (appellants· brief page :l) and in their argu1uent one ( appellants' brief page 9 and 11) contend that the respondents
breached the eontract with the appellants by not installing heaters of a brand nmne of Crosley. At no tinw
during the trial did the appellants produce any evidence
other than ~Ir. Finlayson'::3 (R. 119, 129, 136, 141) that
such a type heater exists. However, the respondents
through their direct testi1nony (R. 250, 251, 284, 314)
~how that they have never carried or even heard of such
a heater. Further proof that no such heater exists is
~hown through the tl'~timony of h\·o Gas Cmnpany offirials and the .i\..merican Gas Association's directory (1:.
:!02, 218).
The appellants in their cmuplaint (R. 3) ~ed.: $32o.OO as the purehase price of the heaters whereas in avpellanc~· hrief pag-e 1L! the cost ha;.; gone up $10.00. The""'r
21
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also seek $577.00 (R. 3) as the amount of rental loss.
The appellant states in direct ex3:mination that the
heaters cost $336.00-3 at $89.00 and one at $69.00 which
would make a total of $336.00 (R. 142) and also stated
that the rental loss was $530.00 (R. 132) and $525.00 (R.
161 and appellants' brief page 6). It would appear from
the record that the appellants are not at all certain what
dates the tenants were there, when they moved, and how
much rent was lost. No rent receipts were produced
(R. 159) and the testimony by the appellants is certainly
conflicting even as to the amount that was charged for
rent. To further illustrate the confusion in the appellants' mind as to the loss of rental we respectfully call
your attention to the record at pages 130, 131, 132, 158,
159, 160, 161 and 162).
The contract covered some 13 items of equipment
and inasmuch as the appellants are seeking recovery for
amounts far in excess of the actual cost of the heaters
the respondents respectfully invite the court's attention
to respondents' Exhibit 6 & 7 which set out the actual
cost of each piece of equipment, a summary of which is
as follows:
Date
SOld

Ticket
Number Quan.

Unit
Price

Description

Total

Tax

Grand
Total

8-14-48

4827

1

Maytag Washer $131.85 $131.85 $ 2.64 $ 134.49

8-16-48

4839

3

50,000 Brilliant Fire
Space Heaters
54.20

162.60

8-23-48

4875

4

Apt. Hs. Ranges

86.40

345.60

1

45 Gal. Servel
Water Heater

230.40

230.40

3.25

165.85

11.52

587.52

22
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Servel Apt.
House Refrig.

9- 3-48 4944

4

185.75

743.00

14.86

757.86

1-7-49

30,000 Brilliant Fire
1* Space Heater
49.95
Less 20'/c
10.00

39.95

.80

40.75

5- 6-49

5575

5915**

Total
Less Credit Memo
Net Amount

$1,686.47
11.47
$1,675.00

Xow segregating the heaters from the others you have
3 Heaters costing
$ 165.85
1 Heater costing
40.75
Total cost of heaters

$ 206.60

I~.,rom

the above analy~i~ it i~ very evident that the
eo~t of the heater~ can not po:'~ibly be nwre than $206.60
including sales tax which is approximately $120.00 less
than that sought by appellant~. 'Ve think this speaks for
itself, of coun;;e using these so-called "defective heaters"
for several years nuiy have enhanced their value $120.00.
Inasmuch a~ there is ~o 1nuch discrepancy relative
to the appellanb' te~tin10ny as to ·when the aparhnents
were vacant we deeu1 it only fitting and proper that the
eomplete analy~i ~ of the dates the gas "\Vas connected in
each apartment should be made at this ti1ne. It is not
eoneeivable that a party living in an apartn1ent would
lmve the ga~ turned on or off very utany day~ l)efore he

* This
**

heater was indavertently not written up at 'the time of the
others but was set aside when the other heaters were.
This credit memo not run thru the records until May 1949 bwt as
both Exhibit A and B will show was taken into consideration in
the calculations.
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or she moved in or out of an apartment, therefore, the
most reliable record would be the "turn on" and "off"
and "meter reading" sheets of the gas company which
is evidenced by Exhibit #2 (R. 202, 203, 204, 205, 206,
207). We wish to point out that the below listed analysis
is a complete record up to the time of the trial which
would include the period from June 1949 to April1951,
a period which by all means is most favorable to the
appellants because it includes a considerable length of
time past the warranty period of one heating season,
nevertheless, we submit it for your consideration:
Apart. No.
and Location

Name of Tenant

Date
Date
Conne'cted Discon. Meter No.

Water Heater
Basement

Allan L. Finlayson
Edwin Anderson

6-23-49
1-26-50

1-26-50 443-7388
Present

Apt. No.1
WestSide Up

D. A. Bruno
Clarence Peterson
Keith :M. Rice
George Haner
Walter Seggerman

6-28-49
11-25-49
1-28-50
8-15-50
9- 5-50

9-23-49 443-7295
1-28-50
8-11-50
9- 5-50
Present

Apt. No.2
East Side Up

6-23-49 10-12-49 419-560
Douglas Steadman
11-15-49 1-18-50
Glenn E. Lloyd
Kenneth D. Hakanson 1-21-50 8-11-50
8-21-50 Present
Benny Beckstead
Changed
9- 7-50 Meters 444-1272

Apt. No.3
E'ast Side Down
Apt. No.4
West Side
Down

A. M. Swenson
Peter G. Strebel

6-29-49
2- 7-50

10- 4-49 443-7363
Present

6-23-49 10-24-49 443-7417
11- 7-49 12-11-50
1-23-51 Present

Jack C. Beck
Iris C. Lees
J. E. Green

From the above schedule it can be seen that apart24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment Xo. 1 wa::' empty fi·om 10-1-49 through 11-24-49 and
n~ing the rent of $73.00 per month ns stated hy ~~ r ..F.,inlayson (H. 130) the loss of rental would be $135.00.
apartment Xo. ~ wonld haYe a loss of rental of
$SO.S-! as it would be empty fr01n 10-13-49 through 111±-49 and apartment X o. 3 being e1npty from 10-5-49
through 1:2-31-49 would han_• a loss of rental at $65.00
per month of $1SG.-t:J: and aparhnent X o. 4 with a rental
of $55.00 and vaean('y period fr01n 10-25-49 through 11G-+9 would amount to $~:1.39 or a grand total of only
$425.GG under the nwst favorable conditions to the appellants. Further analy:-;is of these fads show that each
amount alleged as shmvn by )[r. Finlayson'~ testinwny
(R. 130-1::1:2, 157-162 and appellants brief page G) is very
different fr01n the above calculation. Taking the above
figun•s, which are certainly the nwst favorable to tlw
appellant~, the loss of rental could not possibly be nwre
than the above figure which is approxiinately $100.00
less than that clailned for by the appellants.
The testimony of :\larie Haner who lived in apartment Ko. 1 (upstairs west) and who only paid $60.00
per month rental, ~ho1vs very plainly that she did not
have trouble with the heaters and did not Inove on account of them ( R. 1:-3S, 1m>, 140) :
~IR.

''Q.
~\.

Q.

HAGERS:

And while you were there, did you ever s1ncll
any gas'?
No, we didu't.
Did you n1ove on account of the gas'?
25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

We moved because we had four children, and
we found a house that was larger, and it
made more room for· us with the house. It
had nothing to do with the gas.

Q.

How much rent did you pay at this time 1

A.

Sixty Dollars.

Q.

Sixty dollars a month 1

A.

Yes."

Mrs. Seggerman who is a present tenant in apartment No. 1 stated that the heater exploded in apartment No. 4 (R. 181, 182) which testimony was stricken
as hearsay but to show to your honorable body that this
is unfounded we set forth direct testimony from Mrs.
Iris Lees who lived in apartment No. 4 (basement west)
for two heating seasons (R. 293, 294, 295) :
MR. SAGERS:

"Q.

Did you have occasion to live in the apartment house of Mr. Finlayson 1

A. I did.
Q. In other words, that would be one complete
heating season and part of another 1
A. Yes.

Q.

Now while you were living there, did you
smell any unusual odors, or did you have any
occasion to be fearful-well, just one question at a time. I'm sorry. Did you smell any
odors1

A.

Just from the hallways.
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Q.

You had no trouble with your heater with
respect to odors!

A.

No.

Q.

"J(rs. Lees, why did you move fr01n the
aparbnent house'

A.

\Yell, one reason because it wasn't big
enough for 1ny husband and three children,
and then I was expecting.

Q.

You were not fearful of the heaters at all f

A.

No."

i\IR. BAYLE :
"Q.

I see; and at any tin1e while you were there
did the stove in your apartment blow up'

A.

It 1nade a noise, but what do you mean by
blowing up1

Q. \Vas there any kind of an unusual explosion' ·
A.

Well, no.

Q.

Did you ever have any trouble with the heater
at all1

A.

\Vhat do you mean, trouble. What kind of
trouble?

Q.

Did you have any situation arise where it
'vasn't functioning norn1ally?

A.

No.

Q.

Never had any difficulty?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you ever experience any physical effects
from what you thought wa~ gas~
27
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A.

No.

Q.

Never had any headaches~

A.

No."

The testimony of Mr. Glenn Earl Lloyd (R. 296,
297, 298) who occupied apartment No. 2 (upstairs east)
for two months during the heaviest of the winter shows
that the heater worked fine:
MR. SAGERS:
"Q. While you were there, did you smell any
odors~

A.

Not that I know of.

Q. Did you have the heaters on while you were
there¥
A. Yes sir.

Q. How did they work¥
A.

Worked fine.

Q. Did you ever have any trouble with
A.

them~

No sir.

Q. Was the gas company ever there at anytime
in regards to the heaters~
A.

The man there in the back come and removed
the heater in November for a period of four
hours( pointed to Mr. Haws).

Q.

Four

A.

That was in my apartment. I don't know
about the others.

hours~

28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. But it wasn't due to any function of the
heater~

A. No. I didn't know what was the matter.

Q. Why did you move from there~
A.

It was too high rent and far out, and my wife
was expecting, and she had a nerve in her
back pinching, and she had to be closer to
a doctor."

The testimony of Mr. Clarence Petersen who lived
in apartment No. 1 for several months during the heating season of 1949-50 is as follows (R. 298, 299):
MR. SAGERS:
"Q. While you were there, did you smell any
odors~

A.

No.

Q. Did you ever have any trouble with the gas
heater~

A.

Well, we didn't use the gas up until-we were
away. We were out working, and the kids
were to school, and they were taken care
of with the other people, and we were at
work and then we would come at night.

Q. But you were t~ere in the morning~
A.

Yes.

Q. And you were there at night~

A. Uh huh.
Q. Did you have the heater on while you were
there~
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A.

'Ve did up to, oh, started in November, when
it started to get cold.

Q.

And you used the heater frmn N oYember to
the time that you n1oved is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ever get any headaches?

A.

No sir.

Q.

Did you ever smell any odors?

A.

No.

Q.

Did the heater ever give you any trouble¥

A.

No trouble at all."

From the foregoing it is the contention of the respondents that the appellants have failed to show that
there has been a loss of rental as they have not produced one single witness or deduced any testimony that
gives any indication that any of the tenants moved on
account of heater trouble.
It 'vould appear that this action was brought solely
to get out of paying the balance of $491.75 due on the
contract. The court quring the respondents' motion to
dismiss stated as follows (R. 114, 115) :

THE COURT:
"Q.

l\Ir. Bayle, have you paid this down to a sum
less than the amount you are praying for
here~

A.

'Ve have paid it down to about that sum,
Your Honor, well, no, we got dan1ages in ad30
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dition for rentals, of course, loss of rentals;
but as to the price of the heaters, we have
down below what we claiin the price of the
heaters cost."
This is definitely refuted in the fact that in the
appellants' complaint and brief they seek recovery of
$336.00 (R. 3, appellants' brief page 14) for the heaters,
yet, the analysis made of Exhibit 6 & 7, supra, shows
the cost of the heaters to be only $206.60 including tax.
Furthermore, appellants stipulated to such at the pretrial (R. 2:2-25) and again in direct testimony (R. 125,
126) by stating that $983.50 had been paid since the
contract was made which in turn would leave a balance of
$491.75 which is considerably more than contended by
the appellants under any circumstances.
Turning our attention now to the question of warranties in the law of sales as applied to the case at bar.
The respondents contend that the appellants are in no
position to complain as the respondents were not properly notified of such a breach of warranty, even if such
were the case. We believe the instant case comes
squarely within the provision of Section 81-3-9, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, which was called to the court's
attention (R. 112) and which provides:

"* * * But if, after acceptance of the goods,
the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of the
breach of any promise or warranty within a
reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought
to know, of such breach, the seller shall not be
liable therefor."
31
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In the instant case the appellants never complained
to the respondents until N ovmnber 1949 (R. 309) and
the respondents have only. been over to the appellants'
apartments three times to service the heaters in all the
ti1ne they have been installed as is evidenced by testimony of the respondents and their agents (R. 250, 253,
~55, 258, 276, 302, 309, 311), once in October 1949 and
twice in November 1950 which is almost a year after
the appellants had breached their contract by selling
the heaters to the Andersons (R. 302, 303). Howe,·er, the
respondents do not rely solely upon the above cited statute but in addition and in the 111ain contend that what
little inconvenience, if any, was caused not due to the
heaters at all, hut due to the improper venting and
installation of the flues made by ~r r. Finlayson himself,
which, of course, the respondents had no control over
whatsoever. rrhis is borne out l>y the testimony of f.[r.
Haws who installed the heaters for the respondents (R.
270 to 293 incl).
~tR.

SAGER~:

(more specifically beginning at

page 272):

''Q.

How many elbows were there there?

~\.

'l'here's one, two, three, and the one where it
hits-goes up in the vertical could be classed
as four ninety-degree turns.

Q.

Is the efficiency cut down hy the number of
elbows: I mean for every elbow does that
cut down the efficiency of your draft·~

~\.

For c\·ery ninety-degree L, ·that's equal to
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three feet of pipe, according to the gas coinpany code. That'::-; in flues or fuel lines.

Q. Now, in reference to this particular installation, did you haYe any discussion with reference to this installation with 1\Ir. Finlayson
at the time before they were installed 1
A.

Yes, when ~[r. Christopherson called me
over to see if he should go ahead with it the
way it was requested I told Mr. Finlayson
I didn't think the gas company would approve it if it was put in that way, but it was
insisted that it be put in that way and I put
it ~ that way.

Q. Now, did you notice anything else in the
installation of the equipment which Mr. Finlayson had put in 1
A.

Yes, the fuel lines. Coming from the front
of this house, there's four meters underneath
the porch. Each apartment is on its own
meter. Two of those fuel lines run through
this partition here coming along. It would
be on the floor of the upstairs apartments
and on the ceiling of the downstairs apartments, if you follow me, coming along these
two lines, one for upstairs and one for downstairs. Those lines were in with thread connections, and they were plastered in and concealed, which according to my information
is not according to gas company code to have
a concealed fitting, a threaded fitting plastered in. If they are going to be concealed,
they must be welded.

Q. I show you Mr. Haws, a book marked "Rules
and Regulations for Gas Piping and Installation" put out by the Mountain Fuel Sup-
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ply Company. Are these the codes that you
follow in installing?

A.

At that thne, ye~. I think since then they
have revised some of their code and put out,
but that was the hook in force at the time
of installation.

Q.

At the time you went over there, you had
a conversation-did you have a conversation
with :\I r. Finlayson in reference to the installation?

A.

Yes.

Q. "\Vhat was saidf
..A.

\Yell, we wanted to find out where these
appliances went, for one thing. I wanted to
bring this flue straight through the wall and
put the heater on the flue. For instance, if
we could have gone straight through like
that, there would have been no cause for all
these L's and turns, causing loss of gas fimv.

Q.

In other words, if ~'OU had gone straight
through as you wanted to, would you have
cut out any L's?

A.

About three.

Q.

And the more L's you haye does that cut
down the efficiency ?

A.

Right.

Q.

If you had gone ~traight in, would the draft
have been better?

A.

Couldn't have helped but been better.

Q.

And that's what you wanted to do?

t\.

~rhat's

right. rrherc is one other thing here.
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This five-inch flue, according to the gas company code, does not carry the cross section
area enough to carry two four-inch pipes
going into it. '1 he code reads, if I Inay state,
the vertical shall be the full cross section
area of the largest pipe entering it from the
horizontal plane plus three-fourths the area
of second pipe. Now, I don't know if the jury
wants to figure out the cross sectional areas
of these pipes* * *
1

A.

* * * but they are two inches shy in cross
sectional area of being adequate.
Q. :Mr. Haws, if you had installed these straight
in, there would have been a better draft,
and in your opinion do you think they would
have worked properly¥
A. I think they would have worked properly
because since that time we have had to
modify the flue after all these other said
changes that you have heard about; and
looking at the same furnace from face view
of it-I call it a furnace; it's a space heater
-going off the back of this diverter, it comes
across here with a slight upgrade and went
in. Now, I have went over, and from this
point here where it comes out the diverter
up to here, there is a thirty-inch length of
pipe, also eliminating this T here. I cut
a hole through the wall and tin snipped into
the inside pipe and made a tight joint there
and have raised that flue in the two upstairs
apartments. The two heaters in the basement
are still identical on their installation.
Q. But at the time you installed them you wanted to do that to begin with, is that correct,
to run them straight in~
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A.

I wanted to go straight 111 hy moving the
heater over here. 'rhiR raise here helped
on the draft after * * *

Q.

When "·as that done 1

A.

I think it was i\ ovember or December of
last year. ~ehis is the last time I have been
over there as far as doing anything with
the heaters is concerned.

Q.

How many- times have you been over there
with the heaters~

.-\.

\Veil, Rince they were installed I think I
have had occasion to be over there three
ti1nes.

Q.

At the time ~~ou took them in there in October
and N ovemher of 1949, I mean took them out
for welding, at ·whose suggestion did you
take them out ?

A.

It was somebody from the gas company, I
wouldn't modify factory specifications on any
piece of equipment without an okey from
someone in authority.

Q.

How long did you have them out 1

.-\.

As I recall, I took two of them out. It took
me four hours apiece on each heater to make
the;.;e four welds on each heater. They were
out and in the same day. It was two days
involved."

'I,his is borne out hy l\Ir. Brady's testimony (R.
310) and ~[r. Lloyd's who was a tenant at the time
(R. 297).
''Q.

r:l\vo out one day and two out the next

day~
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·A.

That's right.

Q. And put thmn back in. What was the * * *
you changed the factory specification'
A.

There was no specifications changed at that
time * * * no, the gas cmnpany's contention
was that this wasn't a welded connection
there. That was a pressed steel connection.

Q. Now, are all of the Brilliant Fire heaters
just pressed steel~
A. All that I have seen.
Q. Have you ever had occas1on to weld any
others~

A.

Q.
A.

Q.

A.

No.
Okey, go on.
Now, that was where the weld was made,
right there. So you see there was nothing
changed on specifications outside of maybe
improving the connection; so that there would
be-there was absolutely no possibility of a
gas leak at that point.
Now, in reference to these heaters, Mr. Haws,
what is the most common cause of spillage or
odor from a h~ater ~
Bad venting."

Without quoting Mr. Haws any further it will be
noted from his testimony that the other eight pieces
of equipment installed were not vented (R. 278, 279,
280). Furthermore, the ones that are vented-the heaters-are done improperly and the appellants would not
permit the respondents to change them (R. 272, 289,
304, 311).
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If there was a breach of warranty as contended
by the appellants it would appear that there would have
been n10re visits made to the apartlnents both by the
respondents and the gas company. Other than the time
the heaters were taken out in N" ovember 1949 and in
October 1950 (R. ~GO, 253, 23:J, 258, 27G, 309, 311), the
respondents did not make any visits to the apartments
and both of these visits as shown above, were due to
the faulty installation of the appellants and not the
respondents. The gas company other than making a
suggestion to weld the collars in October 1949 did not
rnake a call in connection with the heaters until May
D, 1950 which i~ two years after they were installed
and at the close of the first heating season, then thi~
call was only to light the pilot light that had gone out
in Aparhnent Ko. 2 (Exhibit 3). No further calls were
rnade by anyone until September 1950. :Mr. 'franter
in his testimony pointed out that the gas company makes
a service order call slip out every time they are called
(H. 208) and a close ana}~·sis of l~Jxhibit 3 revealf' that
from the tirne the heaters and other equipment were
installed on Deceruber 31, 1948 (R. 127, 253) until the
time of the trial, April 11, 1951, which would certainly
be stating things most favorable to the appellants as
this would be way past the ·warranty period, there haxc
been only 25 service calls for all four apartments and
all 13 pieces of gas equipment. The record also shows
that quite a fe\\· of these 25 calls were for lighting pilot
lights and other pieces of equiprnent rather than the
heaters. Further analyt'is will show that there has
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1

been only an ayerage of 2--± calls concerning each heater
in two and one-third yean-; so if there had been anything drastically wrong there would have been nwre
service calls. As specifically stated by the respondents
the heaters are only guaranteed one heating season.
Mr. Haws testimony shows that he has installed at
least 6-± similar heaters and never had any trouble whatsoever (R. 283), the heaters are American Gas Association approved (R. :219), and are made by a company
that has been in the stove business 105 years _(R. 263),
one of the respondents has even installed similar type
heaters in his mother's and brother's homes (R. 256),
therefore we submit the heaters were not defective.
We believe that the case at bar comes directly
within section 81-5-7 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
which is as follows :
"Where the goods have been delivered to
the buyer he cannot rescind the sale, if he knew
of the breach of warranty when he accepted the
goods, or if he fails to notify the seller within
a reasonable time of the election to rescind, or
if he fails to return or to offer to return the
goods to the seller in substantially as good condition as they were in at the time the property
was transferred to the buyer* * *."
Such is the case here as the evidence adduced and
pointed out above directly show that the heaters are
not defective, improper notice has been given, and at
no time have the appellants offered to return said heaters to the respondents, or have they sought to have
them replaced, but have continued to use the heaters
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all the time ( R. 25+). It is well settled law in Utah
that a purchaser of pen;onal property waive~ or loses
his right to rescind the contract for fraud, breach of
warranty, or failure of the article purchased to conform
to the contract, if he uses it in his business or otherwise
as his own property, for his own benefit or convenience,
and not 1nerely for testing or preserving it, after he has
knowledge of the ground for recission. This doctrine
it> followed in the following cases:
Detroit Heating and Lighting Co. v~. Steven~,
16 l~tah 177;
Summers v:-;. Provo l~'~oundrY and jfachine
·
Co., :lJ LT tah 320;
Advance Rumely Thresher Co. vs. Stohl, 8;}
utah 1~-1-, which was confirmed by 173 Fed.
834-The Y enezuela;
Black on Rescission and Cancellation, 2nd
Ed., Section 599.
r:rhe above is supported by the evidence in that when
the respondents brought their action to replevy the
goods the appellants very quickly filed their bond to
permit then1 to retain the goods. If they had been so
bad and not fit for the purpose, etc. why didn't they
pern1it the respondents to repossess as they had not
paid down to within twice the value of the heaters f

It is also well settled law that an action for damages for breach of warranty will not lie until the title
to the property has passed and in this case title ha~
never IJal:il:led as by the tenw..: of the conditional :.:ale
contract (Exhibit B) title wa::; to remain in the respond40
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ent until all payments are 1nade and there is still a
balance due on the contract of $491.75 (R. 22-25, 125,
216, Exhibits 5 and 7). The appellant breached the
contract by selling it to the Andersons on December 21,
1949 (R. 302) without authority and the new purchasers
were even lead to belieye that the heaters were paid
for (R. 302).
Here the appellants could have continued their payments until title passed, and then brought their action
to recover in damages the difference between the price
agreed to be paid and the actual value, including compensation for loss incurred in their so-called effort· in
good faith to use the heaters in compliance with the
warranty; or they could have promptly returned the
property upon discovering the "so-called defect" and
recovered the consideration paid, or tendered the return
of the property on condition that the respondents return
the payments received and the appellants have not done
any of these, therefore, were not even entitled to be in
court. This is evidenced by :
130 A.L.R. 755 and annotations ;
47 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 887, page 94.

Where parties have produced all their evidence,
and the court has received it, and they have rested their
case at the trial, they have thereby admitted, and in that
way estopped themselves from denying, that they can
do no more to overcome the objection that the evidence
is insufficient to sustain a verdict in their favor, because
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence always
41
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arises m cyery <'ase before its submission to a jury,
and it is the provin<'e and duty of the court to determine
it. 53 American Jurisprudence, Para. 340, Page 2/::l.
\Vhere the evidence is conflicting and the court is
asked to dh·ect a verdict, or on its mYn motion considers
the direction of a verdict, all facts and inferences in
conflict with the evidence against which the action i~
to be taken must be eliminated entirely from consideration and totall~' disregarded, leaving for consideration
that evidence only ·which j~; favorable to the party against
whom the nwtion is leveled. 53 American Juris prudence,
Para. 350, Page 282.
rrhe presence or absence of conflicting testimony in
a cause is a consideration by which the courts are governed in directing verdicts. ""\Vhere the material issues
or controlling facts are conceded, or the proof offered
to establish them is undisputed, uncontradicted, or uncontroverted, or such facts are conclusively established,
or established beyond dispute, or the evidence is all one
"'ay, and is unconflicting and uncontradictory, and only
one legitimate inference may be drawn, and there are
no circumstances which tend to impair or impeach it,
and it is not susceptible of inherent weaknesses, improbabilities, and incongruities which in and of themselves naturally arise to contradict or impeach the
"·eight and credibility of the utterances of the witnesses, the only question being one of law, the court
may, should, and must, direct a verdict. 53 American
.T uris prudence, Para. 358, Pages 287 and 288.
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As has been said, credibility, either one way or the
other, should n1ake no difference in the operation of
the fundan1ental principle which necessarily underlies
the direction of verdicts in all cases. The question
whether reasonable minds could arrive by reasoning
processes at n1ore than one opinion or conclusion is
always a question for the trial judge. 53 .American
Jurisprudence, Para. 363, Page 291.
The court's attention is respectfully invited to Fonville vs. Wichita State Bank and Trust Co., 33 A.L.R.
125, 161 Arkansas 93, 255 S.W. 561, wherein the court
states:
"The court should direct a verdict where
there is no evidence sufficient to justify submission of the case to the jury."
The court in Rosenfield vs. United States Trust
Company, 122 A.L.R. 1210, 290 Mass. 210, 195 N.E.
323 states:
"A party is not entitled to the submission
of the case to the jury where the evidence is
insufficient to warrant a finding in his favor."
The California court in California Packing Corp.
vs. Lopez, 64 A.L.R. 1412, 207 Cal. 600, 279 P. 664, states :
"The court has the right to direct a verdict
only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, and
giving opposing evidence all the value to which
it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate
inference which may be drawn therefrom, the
result is a determination that there is no evi43
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dence of sufficient substantiality which would
support a verdict contrary to the one direeted, if
given."
The above view 1s supported in Walters vs. Bank
of America "A' at irJilal Trust and Savings Association in
110 A.L.H. 1259, 9 Cal. 2d 46, 69 P. 2nd 839.
Applying these principles to the instant case and
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs-appellant~, we respectfully submit that the
trial court rightfully concluded that the plaintiffs-appellants had failed in their burden of proof to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that there existed any
breach of warranty insofar as the heaters were concerned and that they had also failed to show any loss
of rental. r:rhis is easily substantiated by the view of
the court in its remarks at the conclusion of the trial
and at the time it directed a verdict in favor of the
defendants wherein the court said:
"\Yell, in view of the evidence there still
i ~n't, I think, anything for the jury to fuss about.
You have listened patiently and long, and these
parties have a hurden to ~how by n preponderance of the evidence their various propositions,
and I have gone through them pretty thoroughly,
and in 1nv n1ind burdens have not been established
except '~'here they have been established and
it's so well established that there is no need for
argument about the thing." (R. 327)
"Ninth, did the plaintiff lose rental hy reason
of improper installation of the equipment described in thi~ con1plaint or by rea::;on of a
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defective condition of the· equipment~ Well, I
don't think there is any evidence that you could
say he did. He says he lost rental, but all the
evidence is he came down here and his apartments were vacant, and sometime later he rented
them. Can you or I say those tenants moved
out because of leaking gas~ He didn't bring any
of the tenants here, and they were out when he
got here, so there isn't any evidence you can find
that, or there isn't anything for you to dispute
about it.
"If he did lose rentals, what was the amount~
Well, he hasn't proved there was any loss, so
you can't tell that." (R. 329)
In view of the foregoing comments it was overwhelmingly apparent from the evidence adduced at the
trial that the court was more than justified in directing
a verdict in favor of the defendants and that there was
nothing for the jury to act upon and the court would
have erted in ruling otherwise than it did.

POINT II
· The appellants in their brief, page 15, state that
they had exhausted all patience before they brought
this suit. It would appear from the evidence adduced
and the foregoing arguments presented by the respondents in argument No. 1 that the facts show quite the
contrary. The appellants have repeatedly breached the
contract as they did not adhere to their promise to pay
cash within 90 days; secondly, they would not sign the
45
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valid conditional sale contract (Exhibit B) until March
1949; thirdly, they have been delinquent in not one but
every single payment that was due since the contract
was signed. The appellants have stated in their brief,
page 15, that Owen Despain, Assistant Cashier of Sandy
City Bank asserted that the only period during which
the plaintiffs were delinquent in their payments under
the contract were when they had been granted a deferrnent. We invite the court to search :Mr. Despain's
testimony as the respondents have found quite to the
eontrary as follows (R. 234):
~IR. ~AGERS:

"Q.

\Yell, you can delete that, yes, that's all
right. Take from then on if they were deferred to July 17, then from July, was the July
and August payments paid on time and so on
down the line?

A.

As I would interpret this reoord, there were
no payments that were paid.

Q.

No payrnents paid on time. IH that right!

A.

On exact date."

r:rhe appellants complain that they had the payments
deferred until July 17, 1949 (R. 226, 234) yet, on the
other hand, state the heaters were not connected until
Septernber 1949 (appellants brief, page 6, R. 128). In
analyzing this we are at a loss to see how the appellants
could expect to hlame the deferral of payments and nonpayment of payments to the "so-called defective heaten;" when the heaters were not even operating at that
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time as shown by their own testilnony. The court's attention is respectfully invited to Exhibit 4 which are samples of the bank's delinquent notices (R. 229-230) and
Exhibit 5 which is the bank's official payment record
(R. 230). A close analysis of these two exhibits as well
as of nlr. Despain's testilnony (R. 225-236) will speak
for themselves.
To further show that it was the appellants who
breached the contract and not the respondents, we wish
to point out that the equipment was sold to the Andersons (appellant's brief, page 6, R. 164, 302) without
authority or permission which is in direct violation of
paragraph 3 of Exhibit B.
· ·The appellants complain further in their brief,
page 15, that the respondents brought a separate action
in replevin. The court's attention is invited to the pretrial order (R. 22-25) wherein the court consolidated
the two actions and denied the respondents the cost of
filing their action. It will also be noted from the Memorandum and Cost sheet (R. 50, 51) that this pretrial
order was adhered to, therefore there is no reason for
complaint. All the court awarded the respondents was
the balance due, which they were rightfully entitled
to under any circumstances, on the contract of $491.75,
interest, and attorney's fees which were all provided
for by the contract (Exhibit B). The respondents were
denied damages for the refrigerator which amounted
to the full amount of $185.75 as they have been unable
to sell it since replacing it for the appellants.
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The respondent~ invite the court to place themselves in the position of the respondents who had continually pern1itted the appellants to violate the contract
without taking any legal steps as they didn't want to
he involved in litigation ( R. 258) and have not so been
involved in all six years of operation (R. 238), but
when the appellants saw fit to involve the respondents
in litigation, which is as shown hy the evidence merely
a subterfuge to try and get out of paying the balance
due on the contract, the respondents felt it high time
to seek recovery by repossession proceedings. It is
more than evident that it was the respondents who repeatedly extended the olive branch rather than the
appellants.
In the light of the evidence adduced, we respectfully
conclude that the trial court was certainly not in error
in entering judgment on the contract and in awarding
attorney's fees to the defendants as provided for by
Exhibit B.
POINT III
The appellants in their brief, page 16 and 17, complain that the trial court erroneously entered findings
of fad and conclusions of law and judgment and the
court exceeded its authority by having the clerk of the
court sign the verdict and judgment nunc pro tunc.
The respondents admit that findings and conclusions
and judgment by the court were entered in error but
also submit that hy such entry they did not deprive
48
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1e appellants of any rights and therefore such entry
ras merely superfluous. However, on the other hand
re invite the court's attention to Rule 60 (a) Utah
tules of Civil Procedure, which permits the correction
1f such mistakes and is as follows:
" (a) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders
or other parts of the record and errors therein
arising frorn oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after
such notice, if any, as the court orders * * *."
The respondents position being that the above entry
.vas a mistake and a clerical error only and certainly
lid not prejudice the appellants in any respect. Although
.ve have no Code provision on this matter, our court
rras recognized the inherent right of a court to enter a
judgment nunc pro tunc to correct such errors. In this
respect please be referred to the following:
Frost vs. District Court, 96 Utah 106, 83 P.
(2d) 737, on rehearing, 96 Utah 115, 85
P. (2d) 601;
126 A.L.R. (annotation on page 956) 949 ;
In

r~ Remick's Estate (California), 170 P.
(2d) 96.

The respondents contend that the signing of the
verdict by the clerk and the signing of the jury foreman's name are mere ministerial acts and therefore
certainly within the purview of the court's discretion-
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ary power to order thent to be done. The clerk acts
as the court directs and therefore the clerk's duties
in this respect are ministerial. Furthermore, the ren.
dition of the verdict by the jury as directed by the court
is a mere for1nality, the decision in effect being one
of law hy the court. 53 American Jurisprudence, Para.
353, Page 283. "\Y e are of the opinion that if the foreInan of the jury refuses to sign his name to the Yerdict
as directed by the court the court could place the jury
foreman in contmupt for such refusal. Therefore, in
the court ordering the clerk to enter the nunc pro tunc
order it was 1nerely doing "now for then" what could
have and should have been done at the close of.the trial,
thus there was no abuse of the court's authority, the
judgment was not altered, was valid, and the appellants
not prejudiced.
The appellants in citing Title 104-30-8, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943 were in error as this section of the code
was abrogated by Rule 58A of the U.R.C.P. which
becmne effective January 1, 1950 and therefore is the
only rule in force. However, as this new rule is similar
in i1nport to the above statute and the court was
within its proper bounds the appellants have no cam~e
to cmnplain.
Viewing the circumstances in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs-appellants and assuming Rule
38..:\ (a) to he identical with 104-30-8, F.C.A. 1943, the
court was stiH acting within its power to enter nunc
pro tunc orders and the signing of the verdict and the
50
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judgment on the verdict were mere formalities. The
court in having the clerk sign the judgment the same
day the nunc pro tunc order was n1ade would give it
the same import as though it was signed on April 12,
1951. · If anyone was prejudiced by this order it was
the respondents as in the original verdict (R. 331) the
respondents were given a lien on the property but
the appellants were granted a stay of execution of 30
days, but in the nunc pro tunc order the respondents
were not given any lien. This procedure in effect stayed
the proceedings, which in turn would not require the
judgment to be entered within 24 hours as relied upon
by the appellants. However, if the judgment should
have been entered in 24 hours as contended by the
appellants then they have no cause to complain as their
motion for a new trial would not be timely made as
it was not made until April 24, 1951 (R. 48) which
would be past the deadline of 10 days as permitted
by Rule 59 (b) U.R.C.P. The respondents do not rely
on this contention but on the nunc pro tunc order, as the
court was within its proper rights in entering such.
The appellants contend in their brief, page 17, that
a new trial should have been granted on the above point
alone. The court's attention is respectfully invited to
Rule 61 of U.R.C.P. which states:
"No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in
any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is
ground for granting a new trial or otherwise
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disturbing a judg1nent or order unless refusal
to take such R.ction appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
every stage of the proceedings n1ust disregard
any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
By the enterinLr of the nunc pro tunc order neither
party was hurt aH the same order was entered "now
for then."
~lotions for new trials being limited to statutory
grounds only and the appellants failing to show any
of the seven grounds for a new trial as granted by Rule
59 of U.R.C.P. and the court certainly not exceeding
its authority, very properly denied the motion of the
appellants for a new trial.

POINT IV
r:rhe respondents being forced into litigation by the
appellants, being c01npelled to bring a replevin action
to recover their property because of the repeated violations of the terms of the contract by the appellants,
and being put to great expense and trouble to defend
this appeal respectfully request that your honorable
body award the respondents a reasonable attorney's
fee and costs or else remand this case to the trial court
in order that it may award such, for the defense of
this appeal. A reasonable attorney's fee being $500.00.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence adduced even when construed most
[avorable to the -appellants,- shows that the appellants
failed in their burden to prove any loss of rental, that
they failed to show the heaters were defective, that the
respondents breached their contract, or that the appellants sustained a breach of warranty. Quite to the
~ontrary the evidence overwhelmingly supports the
respondents' position that the appellants repeatedly
breached the contract in many respects. Therefore, no
other verdict than a directed verdict could be sustained
and the lower court's decision should be affirmed by
your honorable body.
Respectfully submitted,

VICTOR G. SAGERS,
Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents
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